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Abstract: US leadership in NATO has been declining since the
Cold War ended. From a European perspective, the United States
looks more and more like a “reluctant ally.” A re-nationalization of
European security could occur without strong US leadership. The
United States should, therefore, reassert itself in European security affairs—not with costly troop contributions, but by facilitating
European unity and the development of relevant force structures.

S

ince its creation in 1949, NATO has been the most important
alliance for America. US engagement and leadership in NATO
has, however, been declining since the Cold War ended; this has
been especially true during the Obama administration and in particular
since the Libya War in 2011. In general, Obama’s administration has
engaged less in international security affairs; the strategic rebalancing to
the Asia-Pacific has definitely moved the US focus from Europe to that
region.1
Although the US government plans to send more troops to Europe
during 2017 and takes Russian aggression seriously, military operations
against ISIS in Iraq and Syria have moved Washington’s focus from
Ukraine and Russia to the Middle East. In addition, the appetite for supporting Europe among US politicians and the American public seems
to have declined. From a European perspective, the United States looks
more and more like a “reluctant ally,” a characterization normally used
by Washington to describe some of NATO’s allies during the Cold War.2
How does this reluctance manifest itself? What might it lead to?
How should the United States act to facilitate more security in the transatlantic region without increasing the costs for American taxpayers? A
re-nationalization or division of European defense and security is likely
to occur without strong US leadership, and that will probably lead to a
stronger Russian influence in European affairs which is clearly not in
Washington’s interest. The United States should, therefore, regain its
leading role in European security affairs—not with massive troop contributions, as in the Cold War, but with strong and firm leadership that
can facilitate European unity and help to create relevant force structures
capable of defending Europe and contributing to its security.
1      Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016.
2      Janusz Bugajski, “The Reluctant Ally,” Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 23 (2010): 101-104.
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NATO’s Declining Role in US Grand Strategy

During the Cold War, Europe had a major role in US grand strategy
and the United States led NATO with a firm hand. There was never any
doubt the United States was the primus inter pares in European security
affairs. To borrow Max Weber’s concept, Washington led NATO in a
charismatic way.3
That has changed however. Even the Ukraine Crisis failed to make
Europe a major player in US grand strategy. For example, in his comprehensive speech about the US foreign policy agenda for 2016 at the
National Defense University (NDU) in January 2016, Secretary of State
John Kerry, used just one sentence to describe the situation in Europe,
and in that sentence he mentioned NATO once.4
The demonstration of Europe’s decreased importance in US security policy was not new. When Robert Gates gave his last major speech as
Secretary of Defense he criticized NATO for being a two-tiered alliance,
for having a “dim, if not dismal” future, and said future US political
leaders “may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO
worth the cost.”5 Gates’ view of NATO meetings was they were “excruciatingly boring,” and he had to do crossword puzzles to stay awake.6
The Obama administration’s decline in interest in Europe compared
to other regions and the reluctance to lead NATO in traditional ways
have been demonstrated over and over again, especially since the Libyan
War in 2011.7 That war caused a comprehensive discussion in the United
States about burden-sharing in NATO between the United States and
Europe, and especially who should take the lead in such an operation.
Secretary Gates and several other members of the cabinet—even Vice
President Joe Biden—were against the war, and the Obama administration wanted NATO’s European members to take the lead. In short, they,
saw the Libyan War as a way for NATO to revitalize itself and to move
toward a more fair transatlantic burden-sharing.8
During the Libyan War, President Obama stated NATO would
take command of the enforcement of the arms embargo and the no-fly
zone, and the United States would play “a supporting role.”9 Later, in a
speech to the United Nations at the end of September, the president said
the United States “was proud” to play a decisive role in the early days

3      Weber quoted in Joshua Derman, “Max Weber and Charisma: A Transatlantic Affair,” New
German Critique 38, no. 2 (2011): 56.
4      John Kerry, “Remarks on the United States Foreign Policy Agenda for 2016,” January 13,
2016, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/01/251177.htm (accessed January 17, 2016).
5      Robert Gates, “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO),” Speech, June 10, 2011,
http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581 (accessed September 18, 2011).
6      Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 194.
7      The arguments and examples given in this article are to a large degree relying on the results in
Magnus Petersson, The US NATO Debate: From Libya to Ukraine (New York: Bloomsbury Academic,
2015). In the book, I systematically analyzed the US debate within Congress, the Obama administration, think tanks, and elite media from 2011 to 2014. Further examples can be found in the
publication.
8      Gates, Duty, 518; and Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster,
2014), 370.
9      Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya,”
March 28, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-presidentaddress-nation-libya.
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of the operation, and then in a supporting capacity.10 Soon thereafter,
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said the United States had merely
“helped” NATO achieve its mission in Libya.11 The message could not
be clearer: the United States has willingly stepped back and relinquished
its leadership role in the alliance.
Between the end of the Libyan War and the Ukraine Crisis, the
Obama administration allowed NATO to “lead itself.” Secretary
Panetta, for example, said in Munich (February 2012), that NATO had
proven it could handle the security challenges of the 21st century, and
moved closer to the vision for the Atlantic community articulated by
President John F. Kennedy in 1962, namely, that the United States and
Europe should cooperate on a basis of “full equality.”12
US and NATO reactions to the Ukraine Crisis in the spring and
summer of 2014 were, in constrast, rapid, forceful, and substantial.
President Obama took the lead, and it was welcome from a European
point of view. Since the Ukraine Crisis, phrases like “leading from behind”
or “taking a back seat” dropped from the vocabulary of the administration. The United States sent troops to Europe to bolster US military
presence. President Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, and Secretary of
State John Kerry visited Europe several times, especially NATO’s most
recent European members, and American and NATO forces were sent
to reassure them NATO’s “Musketeer Paragraph”—“one for all and all
for one”—Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, was viable.13
At the same time, Obama continued to make it quite clear, that
leading together also meant sharing the burdens together.14 After the
spring and summer of 2014, the US security debate again turned away
from Europe, preferring to cover the military operation against ISIS in
Iraq and Syria, later to be known as Operation Inherent Resolve.15 In
August 2014, the The New York Times published 252 articles on Ukraine,
277 on Syria, and 360 on Iraq; in January 2015, it published 125 articles
on Ukraine, 200 on Syria, and 272 on Iraq; in January 2016, it published
60 articles on Ukraine, 248 on Syria, and 280 on Iraq. The pattern is the
same in the The Washington Post: 525 articles on Ukraine, 667 on Syria,
and 1,125 on Iraq in August 2014; 206 on Ukraine, 479 on Syria, and
740 on Iraq in January 2015; and 111 on Ukraine, 623 on Syria, and 693
on Iraq in January 2016.
The United States has built a large coalition of more than 60 countries to defeat ISIS with political, economic, and military means in the
summer of 2014. NATO was not a part of the coalition against ISIS;
10      Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at High-Level Meeting on Libya,”
Speech, September 20, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/20/remarkspresident-obama-high-level-meeting-libya (accessed February 20, 2013).
11      Leon E. Panetta, “Lee H. Hamilton Lecture,” Speech, October 11, 2011, http://archive.
defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1620 (accessed January 24, 2013).
12      Leon E. Panetta, 48th Munich Security Conference, February 4, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/
united-states/panetta-clintons-remarks-munich-security-conference-germany/p27293.
13      Magnus Petersson, “The US and the Wales Summit: Washington is Back, and NATO Is Back
to Basics,” ELN, September 11, 2014, www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org (accessed July 1, 2015).
14      See, for example, Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Renzi
of Italy in Joint Press Conference,” Speech, March 27, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/03/27/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-renzi-italy-joint-pressconfe (accessed July 1, 2014).
15      Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Exhaustion,” Survival 57, no. 5 (OctoberNovember 2015): 77-106.
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nor did it lead the military operation. In fact, the United States several
times made it clear the coalition against ISIS was not a NATO operation. For example, when Secretary Kerry made a statement at NATO
Headquarters, in the beginning of December 2014, in connection with
a meeting of the participants in the coalition against ISIS, he demonstratively began the meeting by stressing that “despite the location, this
is not a NATO event.”16
During 2015 and 2016, the pattern was the same. Seven of Secretary
of Defense Ashton Carter’s speeches and remarks during 2015 were
focused on countering ISIL; only one focused on the situation in
Europe.17 The additional $3.4 billion requested in the FY 2017 budget
for strengthening US military presence in Europe (a quadrupling of the
request for FY 2016) is clearly an increase, but it must be compared to
the request for $7.5 billion to counter ISIL, and that is not a change in
the long-term trend.18
In sum, the US government has not been willing to lead NATO
in a “charismatic way” since the Libyan War. With the exception of
the spring and summer of 2014, the Obama administration has instead
pointed to NATO’s European allies to step up, take more responsibility,
and share the burdens within the alliance. That burden-sharing debate
is not new—it has been going on since NATO’s creation. But what is
new is the US government’s minimalist view of American engagement
within and leadership of NATO. The question is what might it lead to?

Consequences for European and Transatlantic Security

The decreased US interest in Europe is well documented.19 According
to several experts, NATO has transformed to a “post-American” alliance. NATO and Europe are no longer the first strategic priority for
the United States. Its major role in American grand strategy has thereby
disappeared. Several experts have suggested Washington might expect
the European security challenges to be handled primarily by NATO’s
European allies in a new transatlantic burden-sharing model, and the
US role, therefore, should be principally “Article V-focused.”20 What
that means is Europe and NATO should be a more traditional military
alliance in US security thinking, comparable to what NATO was before

16      John Kerry, “Remarks at the Counter-ISIL Meeting,” December 3, 2014, http://www.state.
gov/secretary/remarks/2014/12/234624.htm (accessed January 6, 2015).
17      See Secretary of Defense Speeches, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches.
18      Ash Carter, “Submitted Statement – House Appropriations Committee-Defense (FY 2017
Budget Request),” February 25, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/
Article/672855/submitted-statement-house-appropriations-committee-defense-fy-2017-budgetreque (accessed March 3, 2016); and “Opening Statement – House Appropriations CommitteeDefense (FY 2017 Budget Request),” February 25, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/
Speech-View/Article/673093/opening-statement-house-appropriations-committee-defense-fy2017-budget-request (accessed, March 3, 2016).
19      Ellen Hallams, “Between Hope and Realism: The United States, NATO and a Transatlantic
Bargain for the 21st Century,” in NATO Beyond 9/11: The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance, ed.
Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti, and Benjamin Zyla (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 218.
20      Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer, “Towards a ‘Post-American’ Alliance? NATO BurdenSharing after Libya,” International Affairs 88, no. 2 (2012): 313–327.
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the Korean War, with mutual security guarantees but without common
permanent military command structures.21
In theory, that is a perfectly fair argument, however, what mighthappen if the United States continues to pay less attention to European
security? The risk is re-nationalization of security and defense issues,
the generation of individual national security thinking and solutions
rather than collective ones. That will lead to less cohesion and more
friction between European states and thereby decrease the security in
Europe. Second, it will generate less security and cooperation between
European states, which means less military power and thereby less security in Europe. Third, it will create a bi-lateralization of security issues
between European states, between single European states and Russia,
and between single European states and the United States.
As has been shown several times, the European Union(EU) is not
an alternative to NATO and the transatlantic security community. The
EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is largely a failure.
As the Libyan crisis showed “precisely the type of mission for which
the EU, via CSDP, had been preparing” could not be handled by the
European Union.22 A similar failure occurred in 2008 when the United
Nations requested EU military support for the mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC).23 In fact, the EU battle groups that
have been fully operational since 2007, have never been used.
Russia would almost certainly welcome a re-nationalization of security and defense issues in Europe. In such a situation Russia could always
be an equal partner among the regional great powers in Europe (France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom) and could play one against the
other. The small states will, in turn, be squeezed between the regional
great powers and dependent on their power plays. The United States will
also be dragged into them, directly or indirectly, in addition to dealing
with its own complicated bilateral relationships with 26 European
NATO members and 22 NATO partners. That would be an extremely
difficult situation with 48 European states competing with each other
for US attention and support. The effect would be more friction and less
security in Europe.
Fourth, re-nationalizaton would mean less security for the United
States. If Washington leaves the permanent command structures, the
capability gap between NATO’s European members will increase
even more and the degree of interoperability between American and
European forces—which actually is relatively high after 25 years of joint
operations—will decline. That will leave the United States with fewer
possibilities and less flexibility when it wants to use force for political
purposes.
21      Sean Kay, “No More Free-Riding: The Political Economy of Military Power and the
Transatlantic Relationship,” in NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will, ed. Janne
Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). See also Barry
R. Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (January/
February 2013) and Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2014).
22      Jolyon Howorth, “European Defense Policy Needs Recalibration,” foreignpolicy.com, June
29, 2012, (accessed March 3, 2016).
23      Ludovica Marchi Balossi-Restelli, “Fit for what? Towards explaining Battlegroup Inaction,”
European Security 20, no. 2 (2011): 155.
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Finally, a transatlantic drift in combination with a re-nationalization
of European security and defense will have ideological and cultural
implications: Western ideas, values, norms, and rules will not set powerful global standards as they do today, and that will lead to less security
not only for the West, but globally. So what should the United States do?

Conclusion

The Obama administration’s interest in European security affairs
has been moderate to low. Nothing indicates the next administration—
even if Hillary Clinton is elected, the least isolationist candidate—will
be more interested. On the contrary, the rebalancing towards the
Asia-Pacific will continue with the view that China is the only global
challenge for the United States. But Russia has recently shown it can
create real problems for the United States in Europe and in the Middle
East. If America continues to disengage from Europe, things could get
much worse. Recently, the US government recognized this possibility,
and the United States seems more interested in leading again, which
offers some hope.24
Europeans realize the United States is not coming back to Europe
with massive military power and economic resources as it did during
the Cold War; at its peak in 1953, the United States had 450,000 troops
in Europe.25 Those numbers are not necessary either, since Europe’s
economy equals the US economy at present, and since NATO’s European
states—although there are always complaints about defense spending in
Europe—spend three times as much on defense as Russia (around $230
billion dollars compared to Russia’s $80 billion dollars) to defend a territory four times smaller. Russia’s GDP is ten times smaller than Europe’s
and smaller than the French, German, and UK economies individually.
The balance within NATO must shift so Europe’s NATO forces
can take care of European defense with American forces acting largely
as force enablers. To achieve that, what Europe needs is not US resources
and military power, but US leadership, engagement, and advice in security and defense issues.
Leadership is the most important contribution because it creates
cohesion and confidence, and avoids a re-nationalization of defense and
security in Europe. The United States should therefore demonstrate
its will to lead NATO in a traditional way, as a primus inter pares, and
lead Europe through NATO; it must not bilateralize its relations with
NATO members and partners. A strong and trusted leader of NATO
will restore confidence in NATO and Article V.
The United States should also lead the way in creating larger forces.
Most NATO members are too small to operate above battalion size, and
they have so few units they cannot operate over time (sustainability), nor
do two things at the same time (flexibility). In addition, the staffs and
commanders have lost their competence in leading larger formations.
24      Ash Carter, “Submitted Statement – Senate Appropriations Committee-Defense (FY
2017 Budget Request,” April 27, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/
Article/744066/submitted-statement-senate-appropriations-committee-defense-fy-2017-budgetrequ (accessed April 30, 2016).
25      Luke Coffey, “The Future of US Bases in Europe: A View from America,” Lecture #1233 on
National Security and Defense, July 15, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/
the-future-of-us-bases-in-europe-a-view-from-america (accessed January 9, 2015).
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Joint force generation has been tried in NATO for a long time; the latest
example is the “Very High Reaction Joint Task Force” (VJTF) that
would be able to deploy a multinational brigade (5,000 troops) within
days, supported by air, maritime, and special forces.26 But joint force
generation is not the basic principle of force generation in Europe, and
with US leadership and experience in building and leading larger forces
that could be changed.
America should also lead the Europeans by encouraging a higher
degree of interoperability. As John Deni has argued, ISAF forced the
NATO countries to develop an “unprecedented depth of operational
and tactical interoperability.”27 But this high level of interoperability
will go down if it is not maintained. Deni suggests the United States
should use its forward-based troops to exercise and train with European
forces. That is a good suggestion, and the degree of interoperability
could increase even more if it also includes the technical level; common
procurement of weapons systems. The United States should take the
lead in such procurement programs within NATO.
The United States should also take the lead in facilitating the
establishment of European forces that have a higher degree of mobility.
Reinforcing Eastern or Southern Europe’s (including Turkey’s) defense
in a crisis from the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, or Spain requires
expeditionary capacity, which the Europeans do not have. Creating
forces that can move fast and securely over long distances has for a long
time been a US specialty and it could be used to lead such a program.
In addition, this could benefit the United States in other ways should it
need European partners in other parts of the world.
American engagement in Europe is also important because it guarantees a continued transatlantic security community on a political and
strategic level. “The West” is under pressure in several ways, not just
strategically but also politically and culturally. The Western world order,
created after World War II, is being challenged, and alternative visions
of order are emerging on different levels and in different regions.28 The
United States should, therefore, continue to engage in European affairs
for its own sake.
The United States knows how to create the best military forces
in the world, and it can offer valuable advice in creating a European
military force that is capable of defending Europe, shaping the security
environment around Europe, and operating—when necessary—with
the US Armed Forces. As Constanze Stelzenmüller argued recently, the
focus should be moved from how much to spend (the input) to how
much to get (the output): “the United States should help Europe figure
out how to develop its capabilities, use its budgets more intelligently,

26      Martin Zapfe, “NATO’s Spearhead Force,” CSS Analyses in Security Policy, no. 174 (May 2015);
NATO “Fact Sheet,” March 9, 2015, www.aco.nato.int (accessed December 29, 2015).
27      John R. Deni, “Maintaining Transatlantic Strategic, Operational and Tactical Interoperability
in an Era of Austerity,” International Affairs 90, no. 3 (2014): 583-600.
28      Trine Flockhart, “An Agenda for NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit: Back to Basicts or Just
Backwards?” DIIS Policy Brief, August 2015, http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/246614/PB_NATO_
FINAL_WEB.pdf (accessed March 2, 2016).
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and create more common European assets and forces (rather than use
bilateral relationships to foster divisions).”29
NATO will survive. But if it wants to be a relevant and effective
instrument for creating European, transatlantic, and—in a wider
sense—global security, it must be led firmly and strongly by an engaged
United States. Unfortunately, there are few signs of that when looking at
the low importance Europe and NATO are given in US grand strategy.
But there is hope; if the United States could lead more, engage more, and
advise more in Europe—which is not costly—it could be the foundation of a fairer burden-sharing and a more stable transatlantic security
community.

29      Constanze Stelzenmüller, “Europe to Planet America: Stay With Us, But Don’t Stampede
Us,” German Marshall Fund Policy Brief, September 2015, 4.

